346.63 Operating under influence of intoxicant or other drug.

(1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while:

(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or any combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance and a controlled substance analog, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; or
(am) The person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.
(b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration.
(c) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of any combination of par. (a), (am), or (b) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating any combination of par. (a), (am), or (b), the offenses shall be joined. If the person is found guilty of any combination of par. (a), (am), or (b) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be
a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions under ss. 343.30 (1q) and 343.305. Paragraphs (a), (am), and (b) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require.
(d) In an action under par. (am) that is based on the defendant allegedly having a detectable amount of methamphetamine, gamma−hydroxybutyric acid, or delta−9−tetrahydrocannabinol in his or her blood, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the incident or occurrence he or she had a valid prescription for methamphetamine or one of its metabolic precursors, gamma−hydroxybutyric acid, or delta−9−tetrahydrocannabinol.

(2) (a) It is unlawful for any person to cause injury to another person by the operation of a vehicle while:

1. Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or any combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance and a controlled substance analog, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; or
2. The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration.
3. The person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

(am) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of any combination of par. (a) 1., 2., or 3. for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating any combination of par. (a) 1., 2., or 3. in the complaint, the crimes shall be joined under s. 971.12. If the person is found guilty of any combination of par. (a) 1., 2., or 3. for acts arising out of the same incident
or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions under ss. 343.30 (1q) and 343.305. Paragraph (a) 1., 2., and 3. each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require.

(b) 1. In an action under this subsection, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury would have occurred even if he or she had been exercising due care and he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or a combination thereof, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, did not have a prohibited alcohol concentration described under par. (a) 2., or did not have a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

2. In an action under par. (a) 3. that is based on the defendant allegedly having a detectable amount of methamphetamine, gamma−hydroxybutyric acid, or delta−9−tetrahydrocannabinol in his or her blood, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the incident or occurrence he or she had a valid prescription for methamphetamine or one of its metabolic precursors, gamma−hydroxybutyric acid, or delta−9−tetrahydrocannabinol.

(2m) If a person has not attained the legal drinking age, as defined in s. 125.02 (8m), the person may not drive or operate a motor vehicle while he or she has an alcohol concentration of more than 0.0 but not more than 0.08. One penalty for violation of this subsection is suspension of a person’s operating privilege under s. 343.30 (1p). The person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10 at any time. If a person arrested for a violation of this subsection refuses to take a test under s. 343.305, the refusal is a separate violation and the person is subject to revocation of the person’s operating privilege under s. 343.305 (10) (em).

(3) In this section:

(a) “Drive” means the exercise of physical control over the speed and direction of a motor vehicle while it is in motion.
(b) “Operate” means the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.

(4) If a person is convicted under sub. (1) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith, or sub. (2), the court shall proceed under s. 343.30 (1q).

(5) (a) No person may drive or operate a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.

(b) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based on a violation of par. (a) or sub. (1)(a) or both for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating both par. (a) and sub. (1) (a), the offenses shall be joined. Paragraph (a) and sub. (1) (a) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require. If the person is found guilty of violating both par. (a) and
sub. (1) (a) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions. Each conviction shall be reported to the department and counted separately for purposes of suspension or revocation of the operator’s license and disqualification.

(6) (a) No person may cause injury to another person by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.

(b) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of par. (a) or sub.

(2) (a) 1. or both for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating both par. (a) and sub. (2) (a) 1. in the complaint, the crimes shall be joined under s. 971.12. If the person is found guilty of violating both par. (a) and sub. (2) (a) 1. for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions. Paragraph (a) and sub. (2) (a) 1. each require proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require.

(c) Under par. (a), the person charged has a defense if it appears by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury would have occurred even if he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or a combination thereof, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving or did not have an alcohol concentration described under par. (a).

(7) (a) No person may drive or operate or be on duty time with respect to a commercial motor vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

1. While having an alcohol concentration above 0.0.
2. Within 4 hours of having consumed or having been under the influence of an intoxicating beverage, regardless of its alcohol content.
3. While possessing an intoxicating beverage, regardless of its alcohol content. This subdivision does not apply to possession of an intoxicating beverage if the beverage is unopened and is manifested and transported as part of a shipment.

(b) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon complaints based on a violation of this subsection and sub. (1) (a) or (b) or both, or sub. (1) (a) or (5) (a), or both, for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating this subsection and sub. (1) or (5), the proceedings shall be joined. If the person is found guilty of violating both this subsection and sub. (1) or (5) for acts arising out of the
same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions. This subsection and subs. (1) and (5) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require. Each conviction shall be reported to the department and counted separately for purposes of suspension or revocation of the operator’s license and disqualification.

History: 1971 c. 40 s. 93; 1971 c. 219; 1977 c. 193; 1981 c. 20, 184; 1983 a. 74, 459, 521; 1985 a. 32, 337; 1987 a. 3, 27; 1989 a. 105, 275; 1991 a. 277; 1995 a. 436, 448; 1997 a. 27, 252; 1999 a. 85; 2003 a. 30, 97.

NOTE: For legislative intent see chapter 20, laws of 1981, section 2051 (13). It is no defense that the defendant is an alcoholic. State v. Koller, 60 Wis. 2d 755, 210 N.W.2d 770 (1973).

Evidence that the defendant, found asleep in parked car, had driven to the parking place 14 minutes earlier, was sufficient to support a conviction for operating a car while intoxicated. Monroe County v. Kruse, 76 Wis. 2d 126, 250 N.W.2d 375 (1977). Intent to drive or move a motor vehicle is not required to find an accused guilty of operating the vehicle while under influence of intoxicant. Milwaukee County v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980). The court properly instructed the jury that it could infer from a subsequent breathalyzer reading of .13% that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the stop. Alcohol absorption is discussed. State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 312 N.W.2d 489 (1981). A previous conviction for operating while intoxicated is a penalty enhancer, not an element of the crime. State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982). But as to operating with a prohibited blood alcohol count, see the note to State v. Ludeking, 195 Wis. 2d 132, 536 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995), 94−1527. Videotapes of sobriety tests were properly admitted to show the physical manifestation of the defendant driver’s intoxication. State v. Haefer, 110 Wis. 2d 381, 328
N.W.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1982). Sub. (1) (b) is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Muehlenberg, 118 Wis. 2d 502, 347 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1984).
The trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence a blood alcohol chart produced by the department of transportation showing the amount of alcohol burned up over time. State v. Hinz, 121 Wis. 2d 282, 360 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1984). The definitions of “under the influence” in this section and in s. 939.22 are equivalent. State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986). Sub. (1) (b) establishes a per se rule that it is a violation to operate a motor vehicle with a specified breath alcohol content, regardless of the individual’s “partition ratio.” The provision is constitutional. State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989). First offender OMVWI prosecution is a civil offense, and jeopardy does not attach to prevent a subsequent criminal prosecution. State v. Lawton, 167 Wis. 2d 461, 482 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1992). Because there is no privilege under s. 904.05 (4) (f) for chemical tests for intoxication, results of a test taken for diagnostic purposes are admissible in an OMVWI trial without patient approval. City of Muskego v. Godec, 167 Wis. 2d 536, 482 N.W.2d 79 (1992). Dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw when it is drawn incident to a lawful arrest and there is a clear indication that evidence of intoxication will be found. State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993). When a municipal court found the defendant guilty of OWI and dismissed a blood alcohol count charge without finding guilt, the defendant’s appeal of the OWI conviction under s. 800.14 (1) did not give the circuit court jurisdiction to hear the BAC charge absent an appeal of the dismissal. Town of Menasha v. Bastian, 178 Wis. 2d 191, 503 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1993). Prior convictions are an element of sub. (1) (b) and evidence of the convictions is required regardless of potential prejudice. State v. Ludeking, 195 Wis. 2d 132, 536 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995), 94−1527. Failure to timely notify a person of the right to an alternative blood alcohol test does not affect the presumption of the validity of a properly given blood test and is not grounds for suppressing the test results. County of Dane v. Granum, 203 Wis. 2d 252, 551 N.W.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1996), 95−3470. A request to perform field sobriety tests does not convert an otherwise lawful investigatory stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. County of Dane v. Campshure, 204 Wis. 2d 27, 552 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1996), 96−0474. Immobility of a vehicle does not preclude a finding that the vehicle was being operated. Movement is not necessary for operation. State v. Modory, 204 Wis. 2d 538, 555 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996), 96−0241. Criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol content subsequent to administrative suspension of a driver’s operating privileges does not constitute multiple punishment and double jeopardy. State v. McMaster, 206 Wis. 2d 30, 556 N.W.2d 673 (1996), 95−1159. Evidence of a refusal that follows an inadequate warning under s. 343.305 (4) violates due process, but admission is subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Schirmang, 210 Wis. 2d 324, 565 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1997), 96−2008. A defendant’s refusal to submit to a field sobriety test is not protected by the right against self−incrimination and is admissible as evidence. State v. Mallick, 210 Wis. 2d 427, 565 N.W.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1997), 96−3048. While prior convictions are an element of a violation of sub. (1) (b), admitting evidence of that element may not be proper. Admitting any evidence of prior convictions and submitting the element of the defendant’s status as a prior offender to the jury when the defendant admitted to the element was an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Alexander, 214 Wis.2d 628, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997), 96−1973. Prosecution under both sub. (1) (a) and (b) does not violate double jeopardy because there can only be one conviction and one punishment. Dual prosecution also does not violate due process. State v. Raddeman, 2000 WI App 190, 238 Wis. 2d 628,
618 N.W.2d 258, 00−0143. A warrantless blood draw is permissible when: 1) the blood is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested; 2) there is a clear indication that evidence of intoxication will be produced; 3) the method used is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection. State v. Thorstad, 2000 WI App 199, 238 Wis. 2d 666, 618 N.W.2d 240, 99−1765. A department of transportation driving record abstract presented at a preliminary examination to show prior convictions was sufficient to establish probable cause of prior offenses. State v. Lindholm, 2000 WI App 225, 239 Wis. 2d 167, 619 N.W.2d 267, 99−2298. Sub. (1), operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol count, is not a lesser included offense of sub. (2) (a), injury−related operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol count. State v. Smits, 2001 WI App 45, 241 Wis. 2d 374, 626 N.W.2d 42, 00−1158. That a person agreed to a breath test, but not a blood test, did not render police insistence on a blood test unreasonable. State v. Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, 247 Wis. 2d 554, 634 N.W.2d 867, 00−3419. By consenting to the taking of a blood sample, the defendant also consented to the chemical analysis of the sample. Those are not separate events for warrant requirement
purposes. State v. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App 275, 248 Wis. 2d 881, 637 N.W.2d 411, 01−0222. Probation is permitted under s. 973.09 (1) (d) for 4th and subsequent OWI violations, as long as the probation requires confinement for at least the mandatory minimum time period under this section. State v. Eckola, 2001 WI App 295, 249 Wis. 2d 276, 638 N.W.2d 903, 01−1044. A warrantless nonconsensual blood draw from a person arrested with probable cause for drunk driving is constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the 4th amendment, even if the person offers to submit to a chemical test other than the blood test chosen by law enforcement, provided that the blood draw complies with the factors enumerated in Bohling. State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385, 99−3165. The analysis of blood taken in a warrantless nonconsensual draw, constitutional under Krajewski, is the examination of evidence obtained pursuant to a valid search and not a second search requiring a warrant. State v. Riedel, 2003 WI App 18, 259 Wis. 2d 921, 656 N.W.2d 789, 02−1772. Evidence from a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw is admissible when: 1) the blood is drawn to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a drunk−driving related violation; 2) there is a clear indication that the blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication; 3) the method used to take the blood sample is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection to the blood draw. In the absence of an arrest, probable cause to believe blood currently contains evidence of a drunk−driving−related violation satisfies the first and second prong. State v. Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, 260 Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407, 01−3367. A DOT certified driving transcript was admissible evidence that established the defendant’s repeater status as an element of the PAC offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Van Riper, 2003 WI App 237, 267 Wis. 2d 759, 672 N.W.2d 156,
03−0385. The rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream of an individual arrested for drunk driving is an exigency that justifies the warrantless nonconsensual test of the individual’s blood, so long as the test satisfies the 4 factors enumerated in Bohling. A presumptively valid chemical sample of the defendant’s breath does not extinguish the exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw. The nature of the evidence sought, (the rapid dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream) not the existence of other evidence, determines the exigency. State v. Faust, 2004 WI 99, 274 Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371, 03−0952. Field sobriety tests are not scientific tests but are observational tools that law enforcement officers commonly use to assist them in discerning various indicia of intoxication, the perception of which is necessarily subjective. The procedures an officer employs in determining probable cause for intoxication go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. City of West Bend v. Wilkens, 2005 WI App 36, 278 Wis. 2d 643, 693 N.W.2d 324, 04−1871. The per se ban on driving or operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in one’s blood under sub. (1) (am) bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the goal of regulating the safety of roadways and is not fundamentally unfair such that there is a due process violation, nor does the statute offend principles of equal protection. State v. Smet, 2005 WI App 263, 288 Wis. 2d
525, 709 N.W.2d 474, 05−0690. A defendant was not operating a vehicle under this section by merely sitting in the driver’s seat of a parked vehicle, although the engine was running, when the uncontested evidence showed that the defendant was not the person who left the engine running, had never physically manipulated or activated the controls necessary to put the vehicle in motion, and there was no circumstantial evidence that the defendant
recently operated the vehicle, while another person had operated the vehicle. Village of Cross Plains v. Haanstad, 2006 WI 16, 288 Wis. 2d 573, 709 N.W.2d 447, 04−2232. Weaving within a single traffic lane does not alone give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop of a vehicle. The reasonableness of a stop must be determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances. State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634, 05−2778. Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove operation of a motor vehicle. While the motor in this case was not running, the keys were in the ignition and the parking and dash lights were on. Even absent a running motor, the jury was entitled to consider the circumstantial evidence to determine how and when the car arrived where it did and whether it was the defendant who operated it. State v. Mertes, 2008 WI App 179, 315 Wis. 2d 756, 762 N.W.2d 813, 07−2757. Although evidence of intoxicant usage, such as odors, an admission, or containers, ordinarily exists in drunk driving cases and strengthens the existence of probable cause, such evidence is not required. The totality of the circumstances is the test. State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, 317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 551, 08−0882. First offense violations of sub. (1) (a) are assimilated under federal Assimilative Crimes Act when committed on federal enclave. U.S. v. Manning, 700 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1988). Offense definition in Wisconsin’s impaired driving statutes. Hammer. 69 MLR 165 (1986). Alcohol and other drugs in Wisconsin drivers: The laboratory perspective. Field. 69 MLR 235 (1986). Effective use of expert testimony in the defense of drunk driving cases. Olson, WBB December 1981. The new OMVWI law: Wisconsin changes its approach to the problem of drinking and driving. Hammer, WBB April, May 1982. Double Jeopardy: A New Tool in the Arsenal of Drunk Driving Defenses. Sines & Ekman. Wis. Law. Dec. 1995. Wisconsin’s New OWI Law. Mishlove & Stuckert. Wis. Law. June 2010.
 

346.65 Penalty for violating sections 346.62 to 346.64.

(1) Except as provided in sub. (5m), any person who violates s.346.62

(2): (a) May be required to forfeit not less than $25 nor more than $200, except as provided in par. (b).

(b) May be fined not less than $50 nor more than $500 or imprisoned for not more than one year in the county jail or both if the total of convictions under s. 346.62 (2) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith or a law of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state in conformity with s. 346.62

(2) equals 2 or more in a 4−year period. The 4−year period shall be measured from the dates of the violations which resulted in the convictions.

(2) (am) Any person violating s. 346.63 (1):

1. Shall forfeit not less than $150 nor more than $300, except as provided in subds. 2. to 5. and par. (f).

2. Except as provided in pars. (bm) and (f), shall be fined not less than $350 nor more than $1,100 and imprisoned for not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) within a 10−year period, equals 2, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of
the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.

3. Except as provided in pars. (cm), (f), and (g), shall be fined not less than $600 nor more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 45 days nor more than one year in the county jail if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1), equals 3, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.

4. Except as provided in subd. 4m. and pars. (dm), (f), and (g), shall be fined not less than $600 nor more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 60 days nor more than one year in the county jail if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1), equals 4, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one. 4m. Except as provided in pars. (f) and (g), is guilty of a Class H felony and shall be fined not less than $600 and imprisoned for not less than 6 months if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1), equals 4 and the person committed an
offense that resulted in a suspension, revocation, or other conviction counted under s. 343.307 (1) within 5 years prior to the day of current offense, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.

5. Except as provided in pars. (f) and (g), is guilty of a Class H felony and shall be fined not less than $600 and imprisoned for not less than 6 months if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1), equals 5 or 6, except that suspensions, revocations or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.

6. Except as provided in par. (f), is guilty of a Class G felony if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1), equals 7, 8, or 9, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one. The confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person under s. 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years.

7. Except as provided in par. (f), is guilty of a Class F felony if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1), equals 10 or more except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one. The confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person under s. 973.01 shall be not less than 4 years. (bm) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) within a 10−year period, equals 2, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par. (am) 2., but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 5 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 5 nor more than 7 days. A person may
be sentenced under this paragraph or under par. (cm) or (dm) or sub. (2j) (bm), (cm), or (cr) or (3r) once in his or her lifetime. (cm) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) equals 3, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par. (am) 3., but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 45 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 14 days. A person may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par. (bm) or (dm) or sub. (2j) (bm), (cm), or (cr) or (3r) once in his or her lifetime. (dm) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) equals 4, and par. (am) 4m. does not apply, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par.
(am) 4., but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 60 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 29 days. A person may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par. (bm) or (cm) or sub. (2j) (bm), (cm), or (cr) or (3r) once in his or her lifetime.

(f) 1. If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under s. 346.63 (1), the person shall be fined not less than $350 nor more than $1,100 and imprisoned for not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months, except as provided in subd. 2.

2. If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under s. 346.63 (1), the applicable minimum and maximum fines and imprisonment under par. (am) 2. to 7. for the conviction are doubled. An offense under s. 346.63 (1) that subjects a person to a penalty under par. (am) 3., 4., 4m., 5., 6., or 7. when there is a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor
vehicle is a felony and the place of imprisonment shall be determined under s. 973.02.

(g) 1. If a person convicted had an alcohol concentration of 0.17 to 0.199, the applicable minimum and maximum fines under par. (am) 3. to 5. are doubled.

2. If a person convicted had an alcohol concentration of 0.20 to 0.249, the applicable minimum and maximum fines under par. (am) 3. to 5. are tripled.

3. If a person convicted had an alcohol concentration of 0.25 or above, the applicable minimum and maximum fines under par. (am) 3. to 5. are quadrupled. (2c) In sub. (2) (am) 2., 3., 4., 4m., 5., 6., and 7., the time period shall be measured from the dates of the refusals or violations that resulted in the revocation or convictions. If a person has a suspension, revocation, or conviction for any offense under a local ordinance or a state statute of another state that would be counted under s. 343.307 (1), that suspension, revocation, or conviction shall count as a prior suspension, revocation, or conviction under sub. (2) (am) 2., 3., 4., 4m., 5., 6., and 7.

NOTE: Sub. (2c) is shown as affected by 2 acts of the 2009 Wisconsin legislature and as merged by the legislative reference bureau under s. 13.92 (2) (i).(2e) If the court determines that a person does not have the ability to pay the costs and fine or forfeiture imposed under sub. (2) (am), (f), or (g), the court may reduce the costs, fine, and forfeiture imposed and order the person to pay, toward the cost of the assessment and driver safety plan imposed under s. 343.30 (1q) (c), the difference between the amount of the reduced costs and fine or forfeiture and the amount of costs and fine or forfeiture
imposed under sub. (2) (am), (f), or (g). (2g) (a) In addition to the authority of the court under s. 973.05 (3) (a) to provide that a defendant perform community service work for a public agency or a nonprofit charitable organization in lieu of part or all of a fine imposed under sub. (2) (am) 2., 3., 4., 4m., and 5., (f), and (g) and except as provided in par. (ag), the court may provide that a defendant perform community service work for a public agency or a nonprofit charitable organization in lieu of part or all of a forfeiture under sub. (2) (am) 1. or may require a person who is subject to sub. (2) to perform community service work for a public agency or a nonprofit charitable organization in addition to the penalties specified under sub. (2). (ag) If the court determines that a person does not have the ability to pay a fine imposed under sub. (2) (am) 2., 3., 4., 4m., or 5., (f), or (g), the court shall require the defendant to perform community service work for a public agency or a nonprofit charitable organization in lieu of paying the fine imposed or, if the amount
of the fine was reduced under sub. (2e), in lieu of paying the remaining amount of the fine. Each hour of community service performed in compliance with an order under this paragraph shall reduce the amount of the fine owed by an amount determined by the court. (am) Notwithstanding s. 973.05 (3) (b), an order under par. (a) or (ag) may apply only if agreed to by the organization or agency. The court shall ensure that the defendant is provided a written
statement of the terms of the community service order and that the community service order is monitored. Any organization or agency acting in good faith to which a defendant is assigned pursuant to an order under this subsection has immunity from any civil liability in excess of $25,000 for acts or omissions by or impacting on the defendant. The issuance or possibility of the issuance of a community service order under this subsection does
not entitle an indigent defendant who is subject to sub. (2) (am) 1. to representation by counsel under ch. 977.
(b) The court may require a person ordered to perform community service work under par. (a) or (ag), or under s. 973.05 (3) (a) if that person’s fine resulted from violating s. 346.63 (2), 940.09 (1) or 940.25, to participate in community service work that demonstrates the adverse effects of substance abuse or of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant or other drug, including working at an alcoholism treatment facility approved under s. 51.45, an emergency room of a general hospital or a driver awareness program under s. 346.637. The court may order the person to pay a reasonable fee, based on the person’s ability to pay, to offset the cost of establishing, maintaining and monitoring the community service work ordered under this paragraph. If the opportunities available to perform community service work are fewer in number than the number of defendants eligible under this subsection, the court shall, when making an order under this paragraph, give preference to defendants who were under 21 years of age at the time of the offense. All provisions of par. (am) apply to any community service work ordered under this paragraph.
(c) If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle or commercial motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction, the court may require a person ordered to perform community service work under par. (a) or (ag), under s. 973.05 (3) (a) if that person’s fine resulted from violating s. 346.63 (2), (5) (a) or (6) (a), 940.09 (1) or 940.25, or under s. 973.05 (3) (a) if that person’s fine resulted from violating s. 346.63 (1) (am) and the motor vehicle that the person was driving or operating was a commercial motor vehicle, to participate in community service work that benefits children or that demonstrates the adverse effects on children of substance abuse or of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant or other drug. The court may order the person to pay a reasonable fee, based on the person’s ability to pay, to offset the cost of establishing,
maintaining and monitoring the community service work ordered under this paragraph.
(d) With respect to imprisonment under sub. (2) (am) 2., the court shall ensure that the person is imprisoned for not less than 5 days or ordered to perform not less than 30 days of community service work under s. 973.03 (3) (a). (2i) In addition to the authority of the court under sub. (2g) and s. 973.05 (3) (a), the court may order a defendant subject to sub. (2), or a defendant subject to s. 973.05 (3) (a) who violated s. 346.63 (2), 940.09 (1), or 940.25, to visit a site that demonstrates the adverse effects of substance abuse or of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant or other drug, including an alcoholism treatment facility approved under s. 51.45 or an emergency room of a general hospital in lieu of part or all of any forfeiture imposed or in addition to any penalty imposed. The court may order the defendant to pay a reasonable fee, based on the person’s ability to pay, to offset the costs of establishing, maintaining, and monitoring the visits ordered under this subsection. The court may order a visit to the site only if agreed to by the person responsible for the site. If the opportunities available to visit sites under this subsection are fewer than the number of defendants eligible for a visit, the court shall, when making an order under this subsection, give preference to defendants who were under 21 years of age at the time of the offense. The court shall ensure that the visit is monitored. A visit to a site may be ordered for a specific time and a specific day to allow the defendant to
observe victims of vehicle accidents involving intoxicated drivers. If it appears to the court that the defendant has not complied with the court order to visit a site or to pay a reasonable fee, the court may order the defendant to show cause why he or she should not be held in contempt of court. Any organization or agency acting in good faith to which a defendant is assigned pursuant to an order under this subsection has immunity from any civil liability in excess of $25,000 for acts or omissions by or impacting on the defendant. The issuance or possibility of the issuance of an order
under this subsection does not entitle an indigent defendant who is subject to sub. (2) (am) 1. to representation by counsel under ch. 977. (2j) (am) Any person violating s. 346.63 (5): 1. Shall forfeit not less than $150 nor more than $300 except as provided in subd. 2. or 3. or par. (d). 2. Except as provided in pars. (bm) and (d), shall be fined not less than $300 nor more than $1,000 and imprisoned for not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months if the number of prior convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of other convictions, suspension, and revocations counted under s. 343.307 (2) within a 10−year period, equals 2. 3. Except as provided in pars. (cm), (cr), and (d), shall be fined not less than $600 nor more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 45 days nor more than one year in the county jail if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of other convictions, suspensions, and revocations counted under s. 343.307 (2), equals 3 or more.
(bm) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) within a 10−year period, equals 2, except that suspensions, revocations, or
convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par. (am) 2., but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 5 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 5 nor more than 7 days. A person may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par. (cm) or (cr) or sub. (2) (bm), (cm), or (dm) or (3r) once in his or her lifetime. (cm) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) equals 3, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par. (am) 3., but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 45 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not
less than 14 days. A person may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par. (bm) or (cr) or sub. (2) (bm), (cm), or (dm) or (3r) once in his or her lifetime.
(cr) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) equals 4, and sub. (2) (am) 4m. does not apply, except that suspensions, revocations,
or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par. (am) 3., but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 60 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 29 days. A person may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par. (bm) or (cm) or sub. (2) (bm), (cm), or (dm) or (3r) once in his or her lifetime.
(d) If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the commercial motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under s. 346.63 (5), the applicable minimum and maximum forfeitures, fines, or imprisonment under par. (am) 1., 2., or 3. for the conviction are doubled. An offense under s. 346.63 (5) that subjects a person to a penalty under par. (am) 3. when there is a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the commercial motor vehicle is a felony and the place of imprisonment shall be determined under s. 973.02. (2m) (a) In imposing a sentence under sub. (2) for a violation of s. 346.63 (1) (am) or (b) or (5) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith, the court shall review the record and consider the
aggravating and mitigating factors in the matter. If the amount of alcohol in the person’s blood or urine or the amount of a restricted controlled substance in the person’s blood is known, the court shall consider that amount as a factor in sentencing. The chief judge of each judicial administrative district shall adopt guidelines, under the chief judge’s authority to adopt local rules under SCR 70.34, for the consideration of aggravating and mitigating
factors.
(b) The court shall consider a report submitted under s. 85.53 (2) (d) when imposing a sentence under sub. (2), (2q) or (3m).(2q) Any person violating s. 346.63 (2m) shall forfeit $200. If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under 346.63 (2m), the person shall be fined $400. (2r) (a) In addition to the other penalties provided for violation of s. 346.63, a judge may order a defendant to pay restitution under s. 973.20.
(b) This subsection is applicable in actions concerning violations of local ordinances in conformity with s. 346.63. (2u) (a) Any person violating s. 346.63 (7) shall forfeit $10.
(b) Upon his or her arrest for a violation of s. 346.63 (7), a person shall be issued an out−of−service order for a 24−hour period by the arresting officer under s. 343.305 (7) (b) or (9) (am).
(c) If a person arrested for a violation of s. 346.63 (7) refuses to take a test under s. 343.305, the refusal is a separate violation and the person is subject to revocation of the person’s operating privilege under s. 343.305 (10) (em). (2w) In determining the number of prior convictions for purposes
of sub. (2j), the court shall count convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus other suspensions, revocations and convictions counted under s. 343.307 (2). Revocations, suspensions and convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one. The time period shall be measured from the dates of the refusals or violations which resulted in the revocation, suspension or convictions. If a
person has a conviction under s. 940.09 (1) or 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, or another suspension, revocation or conviction for any offense that is counted under s. 343.307 (2), that suspension, revocation or conviction shall count as a prior suspension, revocation or conviction under this section.
(3) Except as provided in sub. (5m), any person violating s. 346.62 (3) shall be fined not less than $300 nor more than $2,000 and may be imprisoned for not less than 30 days nor more than one year in the county jail.
(3m) Except as provided in sub. (3p) or (3r), any person violating s. 346.63 (2) or (6) shall be fined not less than $300 nor more than $2,000 and may be imprisoned for not less than 30 days nor more than one year in the county jail. If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under s. 346.63 (2) or (6), the offense is a felony, the applicable minimum and maximum fines or periods of imprisonment for the conviction are doubled and the place of imprisonment shall be determined under s. 973.02.
(3p) Any person violating s. 346.63 (2) or (6) is guilty of a Class H felony if the person has one or more prior convictions, suspensions, or revocations, as counted under s. 343.307 (1). If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under s. 346.63 (2) or (6), the offense is a felony and the applicable maximum fines or periods of imprisonment for the conviction are doubled.
(3r) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, any person violating s. 346.63 (2) or (6) shall be fined the same as under sub. (3m), but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 30 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 15 days. If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under s. 346.63 (2) or (6), the offense is a felony, the applicable minimum and maximum fines or periods of imprisonment for the conviction are doubled and the place of imprisonment shall be determined under s. 973.02. A person may be sentenced under this subsection or under sub. (2) (bm) or (cm) or (2j) (bm) or (cm) once in his or her lifetime. This subsection does not apply to a person sentenced under sub. (3p).
(4) Any person violating s. 346.64 may be fined not less than $50 nor more than $500 or imprisoned not more than 6 months or both.
(4m) Except as provided in sub. (5m), any person violating s. 346.62 (2m) shall forfeit not less than $300 nor more than $1,000.
(4r) (a) If a court imposes a forfeiture under sub. (4m) for a violation of s. 346.62 (2m), the court shall also impose a railroad crossing improvement surcharge under ch. 814 equal to 50% of the amount of the forfeiture.
(b) If a forfeiture is suspended in whole or in part, the railroad crossing improvement surcharge shall be reduced in proportion to the suspension.
(c) If any deposit is made for an offense to which this subsection applies, the person making the deposit shall also deposit a sufficient amount to include the railroad crossing improvement surcharge under this subsection. If the deposit is forfeited, the amount of the railroad crossing improvement surcharge shall be transmitted to the secretary of administration under par. (d). If the deposit is returned, the amount of the railroad crossing improvement surcharge shall also be returned.
(d) The clerk of the circuit court shall collect and transmit to the county treasurer the railroad crossing improvement surcharge as required under s. 59.40 (2) (m). The county treasurer shall then pay the secretary of administration as provided in s. 59.25 (3) (f) 2. The secretary of administration shall deposit all amounts received under this paragraph in the transportation fund to be appropriated under s. 20.395 (2) (gj).
(5) Except as provided in sub. (5m), any person violating s. 346.62 (4) is guilty of a Class I felony.
(5m) If an operator of a vehicle violates s. 346.62 (2) to (4) where persons engaged in work in a highway maintenance or construction area or in a utility work area are at risk from traffic, any applicable minimum and maximum forfeiture or fine specified in sub. (1), (3), (4m) or (5) for the violation shall be doubled.
(7) A person convicted under sub. (2) (am) 2., 3., 4., 4m., 5., 6., or 7. or (2j) (am) 2. or 3. shall be required to remain in the county jail for not less than a 48−consecutive−hour period.

History: 1971 c. 278; 1973 c. 218; 1977 c. 193; 1979 c. 221; 1981 c. 20; 1985 a. 80, 337; 1987 a. 3, 27, 398, 399; 1989 a. 105, 176, 271; 1991 a. 39, 251, 277, 315; 1993 a. 198, 317, 475; 1995 a. 44, 338, 359, 425; 1997 a. 27, 135, 199, 237, 277, 283, 295; 1999 a. 32, 109; 2001 a. 16 ss. 3443k, 4060gm, 4060hw, 4060hy; 2001 a. 109; 2003 a. 33, 97, 139, 326; 2005 a. 149, 317, 389; 2007 a. 97, 111; 2009 a. 100, 180; s. 13.92 (2) (i).

Cross−reference: For suspension or revocation of operating privileges upon convictions for OWI see s. 343.30.
Penalty provisions of sub. (2) are mandatory and apply to subsequent violations committed prior to a conviction for the 1st offense. State v. Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981).
When the accused was represented by counsel in proceedings leading to the 2nd conviction, but not the first, there was no violation of the right to counsel precluding incarceration for the 2nd conviction since the first offense was a civil forfeiture case.
State v. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d 31, 318 N.W.2d 364 (1982).
The state has exclusive jurisdiction over 2nd offense for drunk driving. It is criminal and may not be prosecuted as an ordinance violation. County of Walworth v. Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982). Under sub. (3), a fine is mandatory but a jail sentence is discretionary. State v.
McKenzie, 139 Wis. 2d 171, 407 N.W.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1987). Probation with a condition of 30−days’ confinement in the county jail is inadequate
to meet the mandatory imprisonment requirement of sub. (2) (c). State v. Meddaugh, 148 Wis. 2d 204, 435 N.W.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1988). An OWI conviction in another state need not be under a law with the same elements as the Wisconsin statute to be counted as a prior conviction. State v. White, 177 Wis.
2d 121, 501 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1993). A judgment entered in municipal court against a defendant for what is actually a second or subsequent offense is void. The state may proceed against the defendant criminally regardless of whether the judgment in municipal court is vacated. City of Kenosha v. Jensen, 184 Wis. 2d 91, 516 N.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1994). The general requirements for establishing prior criminal offenses in s. 973.12 are not applicable to the penalty enhancement provisions for drunk driving offenses under sub. (2). There is no presumption of innocence accruing to the defendant as to prior convictions, but the accused must have an opportunity to challenge the existence of the prior offense. State v. Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d 91, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996), 95−0852.
Sub. (2) is primarily a penalty enhancement statute. When a prior conviction is determined to be constitutionally defective, that conviction cannot be relied on for either charging or sentencing a present offense. State v. Foust, 214 Wis. 2d 568, 570 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1997), 97−0499. Seizure and forfeiture under sub. (6) of a vehicle used in the commission of the crime is an in rem civil forfeiture to which the constitution’s double jeopardy clause is inapplicable. State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 577 N.W.2d 601 (1998), 96−1261. The requirement under sub. (6) (k) that a court find a transfer to have been in good faith does not apply to security interests, but the creation of a security interest in a vehicle must be done in good faith in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code. State v. Frankwick, 229 Wis. 2d 406, 599 N.W.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1999), 98−2484.
A trial court cannot accept guilty pleas to both a second and a third offense OWI, and then apply the increased penalties of third offense OWI to the second offense conviction at sentencing. There must be a conviction before the graduated penalties can be used. State v. Skibinski, 2001 WI App 109, 244 Wis. 2d 229, 629 N.W.2d 12, 00−1278.
A defendant convicted of a second or subsequent OWI is subject to the penalty enhancements provided for in both ss. 346.65 (2) and 939.62, if the application of each enhancer is based on a separate and distinct prior conviction or convictions.
State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416, 01−1051.
Nothing in sub. (2m) (a) prohibits chief judges from linking the aggravating and mitigating factors with an appropriate sentence within the broader range of sentences allowed under s. 346.65 when adopting guidelines for their districts. A court may refer to the guidelines when sentencing under s. 346.63 (1) (a), but as the guidelines specifically only apply to s. 343.63 (1) (b) and (5), it is inappropriate for a court to apply the guidelines as the sole basis for its sentence in a s. 346.63 (1) (a) case. That the various judicial districts have different guidelines and defendants may receive different sentences based on where the crime was committed does not make guidelines adopted under sub. (2m) (a) unconstitutional. State v. Jorgensen, 2003 WI 105, 264 Wis. 2d 157, 667 N.W.2d 318, 01−2690.
The proper time to determine the number of a defendant’s prior OWI convictions for sentence enhancement purposes is at sentencing, regardless of whether some convictions may have occurred after a defendant committed the present offense. State v. Matke, 2005 WI App 4, 278 Wis. 2d 403, 692 N.W.2d 265, 03−2278.
When a person is charged under s. 346.63 (1) with a 2nd offense, the charge may not be reduced to a first offense and the court may not sentence under s. 346.65 (2) (a) 1. The department of transportation must treat this as a 2nd offense for purposes of revocation. 69 Atty. Gen. 47.
An uncounseled civil forfeiture conviction may provide the basis for criminal penalties for a subsequent offense. Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (1983).
New Law’s ‘Get Tough’ Provisions Fall Short of the Mark. Pangman & Mutschler.
Wis. Law. Feb. 1993.
Targeting the Repeat Offender. Emerson & Maasen. Wis. Law. Feb. 1993.
Wisconsin’s New OWI Law. Mishlove & Stuckert. Wis. Law. June 2010.